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OVERCHARGING THE UNINSURED IN HOSPITALS: SHIFTING
A GREATER SHARE OF UNCOMPENSATED MEDICAL CARE
COSTS TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
James McGrath*
I. INTRODUCTION
I think there is a shared consensus that the problems with the
[health care] system and the escalating costs, and the escalating
dysfunctions, with more and more losing their health care insurance
every month, are greater than the costs of change.'
Since Bill Clinton spoke those words in 1993, the need for change
has only increased. Articles abound critiquing our health care payment
systems, offering plans to patch, restructure, or totally abandon our
current scheme as it becomes less efficient and more expensive.2 This
article has a less expansive goal: to reveal a hidden federal cost of
treating people without health insurance (the "uninsured"), and to more
fully inform discussions about changing our health care payment system.
The plight of the uninsured in navigating our health care system reveals
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; J.D.,
Howard University; M.P.H., Harvard School of Public Health; LL.M, Temple University
School of Law. I am thankful to many colleagues for their review and critique of previous
drafts, particularly Reginald Oh, Susan Ayres, Maxine Harrington, and Malinda Seymore. I
am also indebted to my friend and former research assistant, Stephanie Livesay, for her
extensive contributions on an early draft of a similar work.
1. HAYNES JOHNSON & DAVID S. BRODER, THE SYSTEM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
POLITICS AT THE BREAKING POINT 25 (1996) (statement of President William J. Clinton).
2. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost et al., The Role of Competition in Health Care: A
Western European Perspective, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 687, 688 (2006); Jonathan
Barry Forman, Making Universal Health Care Work, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 137, 145
(2006); James B. Roche, Health Care in America: Why We Need Universal Health Care and
Why We Need it Now, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1013, 1026 (2001); William P. Gunnar, The
Fundamental Law that Shapes the United States Health Care System: Is Universal Health
Care Realistic Within the Established Paradigm?, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 151, 155 (2006);
Uwe E. Reinhardt, Reforming the Health Care System: The Universal Dilemma, 19 AM. J.L.
&MED. 21, 31 (1993).
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many of the inconsistencies and inequities that have developed
throughout the evolution of our nation's health care payment schemes.
The health care treatment that the uninsured receive is likely to be more
expensive and of lower quality than the treatment received by people
who have health care coverage.3
In addressing problems with our health care payment system, one
of the most contentious debates has been whether the United States
should adopt a plan of universal health care. The debate intensifies over
whether this country should adopt a single payer health care system,
which one commentator describes as a system "in which a federal
agency would centrally administer a single, comprehensive benefits
package financed through general tax dollars .. . . Under a single
payer plan, everyone in the country would receive at least some level of
access to health care for which the federal government would pay.
The federal government already pays for or subsidizes health care
through many commonly known as well as many indirect and hidden
programs. This article explores one particular hidden federal subsidy for
treatment of the uninsured: a tax subsidy that results from unpaid,
uncollected, and inflated health care bills. Acknowledging this hidden
burden on the federal government, the article further erodes two of the
common criticisms against adopting a single payer system in this
country. First, many opponents of a single payer system assume that in
our current multi-payer health care system, competition is necessary to
achieve efficiencies, and that market-based economic effects efficiently
minimize costs and provide adequate health care.5 Second, opponents of
a single payer system predict that a single payer plan would require
excessive new federal expenditures and higher taxes to finance such a
comprehensive system.
6
3. One exception is the provision of emergency services, in which care for both the
insured and uninsured is generally of high quality.
4. John V. Jacobi, Government Reinsurance Programs and Consumer-Driven Care, 53
BUFF. L. REv. 537, 551 (2005).
5. Roche, supra note 2, at 1026.
6. Id. at 1022. Much of the literature supporting a single-payer system notes that the
federal government already is paying most of the health care costs in this country (through
both obvious and unapparent funding programs), reducing the efficacy of a truly competitive
market to control costs. In addition, efficiencies have not materialized with the conversion of
many health care providers from a not-for-profit model into a profit model. Single-payer
system supporters also argue that the implementation of such a plan might actually cost the
government about the same, or even less, than it currently spends on health care. This
argument is based on a reduction in health care subsidies, decreased administration costs,
better utilization of resources, and improved preventive health care.
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Arguments based upon a free market approach to health care
funding do not fully address its effect on the forty-seven million people
in this country currently without health insurance.7 Specifically, free
market proponents do not fully recognize the impact of federal law
requiring hospitals to treat uninsured patients, even if those patients do
not have the ability to pay for hospital services. 8 The question then
arises: if uninsured patients cannot pay for services rendered, who is
paying for their treatment?
The answer is that the federal government already provides some
minimal "coverage" to the uninsured that are unable to pay for medical
care. The government provides this coverage through various programs,
including the previously mentioned hidden subsidy that begins with
health care providers overcharging uninsured patients for medical
services. This subsidy occurs when health care providers charge
uninsured patients a rate that is substantially higher than the
reimbursement the provider would receive from third party payers, such
as private insurers, HMOs, and the federal government through its direct
funding programs. If the uninsured patient fails to pay, the providers
often write off this inflated charge at tax time.
Most hospitals, however, do not pay income tax because they
qualify as charitable, not-for-profit entities.9 While these not-for-profit
hospitals may not benefit from tax deductions, they still benefit by
charging the uninsured inflated list prices. Rather than write off unpaid,
uncollectible bills, not-for-profit entities report them as "charity care."' 0
The ability to maintain their charitable status by overstating their
7. "The percentage [of Americans] without health insurance increased from 15.3
percent in 2005 to 15.8 percent in 2006 and the number of uninsured increased from 44.8
million to 47.0 million." U.S. Census Bureau, Health Insurance Coverage: 2006,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/hlthin06/hlth06asc.html, last visited October 23,
2007 (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
8. See, e.g., The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000).
9. I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3) (2000).
10. See Kizzire v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc., 343 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1074 (N.D. Ala.
2004). The plaintiff claimed the hospital overstated its provision of charity care by claiming
its uncollectible debts as provision of charity care. Plaintiff complained,
Defendant BHS uses Enron-style accounting tricks to grossly distort the small
amount of charity care it does provide to insured patients. Defendant BHS reports
is [sic] amount of charity care as the amount of gross charges-which are grossly
inflated-rather than the cost of actually providing the service. Defendant BHS
further exaggerates the amount of charity care that it does by simply referring to all
bad-debt writes offs [sic] as charity care.
Id. at 1078.
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provision of free care is part of the calculus that allows these hospitals to
be classified as not-for-profit; it may also net these hospitals great
savings from property tax burdens." The practice of claiming
uncollectible debt as charity care has come under heavy scrutiny lately,
as for-profit hospitals provide similar benefits to the community using
this standard, leading many to question the value of not-for-profit
hospitals' tax-exempt status.
12
An example will help clarify the effect of the subsidy. When John
Hernon, an uninsured resident of Massachusetts, suffered a stroke, he
was billed $23,280.80 for his hospital visit (plus an additional
$23,018.10 for doctor's fees and follow-up care over the next nine
months). 13 If he had been a Blue Cross member, the hospital would have
been reimbursed $7000 for his visit.' 4 If he had been on Medicaid, the
hospital would have been reimbursed about $5400 for the same
services.' 5 If John had been unable to pay for his visit, the hospital
would have written off the entire hospital visit at its list price, a price
three to four times the amount it normally would receive for the same
services. 16 Writing off an inflated charge, in this example $23,000, for a
procedure for which the hospital usually would receive no more than
$7000 may reduce the hospital's tax burden, perhaps by as much as its
actual or usual reimbursement for that procedure. In these extreme
cases, hospitals may effectively shift to the federal government the entire
cost of treatment for an uninsured patient.
The federal government, in other words, has become the unwitting
insurer for many who do not actually have either private or government
health insurance, and are unable to pay for health care out-of-pocket.
11. E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 70.1 1(4m)(a) (West 2007) ("The property described in this
section is exempted from general property taxes .... (4m) Nonprofit hospitals. (a) Real
property owned and used and personal property used exclusively for the purposes of any
hospital of 10 beds or more devoted primarily to the diagnosis, treatment or care of the sick,
injured, or disabled, which hospital is owned and operated by a corporation, voluntary
association, foundation or trust .... ").
12. See CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
NONPROFIT HOSPITALS AND THE PROVISION OF COMMUNITY BENEFITS 9 (December 2006),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs76xx/doc7695/12-06-Nonprofit.pdf.
13. Liz Kowalczyk, Uninsured Caught in Costly Twist, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 2004,
at Al.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. John struck a deal with the hospital to make payments of $700 per month. The
hospital was gracious enough to not charge him interest on the debt. He was also charged an
additional $594.78 surcharge that benefits a statewide pool for people who do not have
insurance. Id.
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Some of the uninsured end up being "covered" by the federal
government through this hidden tax subsidy. The odd system that has
evolved for paying for the treatment of the uninsured, however, was
unintended and unplanned. As a result, it has evolved into a grossly
inefficient and inequitable system that is not easily navigated by the
uninsured in need of medical treatment.
First, the system of covering the uninsured is expensive, and,
through the hidden and transparent subsidies provided by the federal
government, the costs ultimately are borne by taxpayers. Many hospitals
take advantage of tax laws to pass on the costs of treating the uninsured
to the federal government. Charging uninsured patients an inflated price
permits hospitals to accrue excess profit from those least able to pay, and
allows hospitals to take advantage of the ability to write off an amount
excessive to their normal billing rate for a given procedure. Moreover,
many of the uncollectible debts arising from treatment of the uninsured
are then discharged through bankruptcy. These bankruptcies,
precipitated by catastrophic health care costs, also add to society's
expense for treatment of the uninsured because additional health care
debt (along with other unsecured debt unassociated with the provision of
health care) will likely be written off as bad debt in the wake of the
patient's personal bankruptcy.
Second, health care treatment for the uninsured is likely to be
untimely, delayed by lack of access to preventive and primary care
available to those who have health care coverage. The uninsured are
forced to visit hospital emergency rooms for ordinary care. The use of
expensive emergency facilities to provide ordinary care to the uninsured
also squanders precious health care dollars in the most expensive and
often least efficient method of treatment. Because of their lack of access
to routine health care options, uninsured patients may also delay
treatment until a routine medical problem actually becomes an
emergency medical condition.
Providing at least minimal coverage for the health care of everyone
could help utilize our precious health care dollars more efficiently. One
of the criticisms of a single payer health care system is that it would
require taxpayers, through the federal government, to pay for the health
care of all Americans. 17 The problem with this critique, however, is that
the federal government is already paying for much of the treatment of
17. Jennifer Prah Ruger, Health, Health Care, and Incompletely Theorized Agreements:
A Normative Theory of Health Policy Decision Making, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 51, 73
(2007).
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the uninsured, in a way that is inefficient, inequitable, and ineffective.
Whatever the problems with a single payer plan, any benefit from
market competitiveness that exists in our current health care payment
system is cancelled by its gross systemic inefficiencies.
Part II of this article provides a brief history of the health care
funding system and examines our current pricing scheme. Part III
analyzes the current hospital pricing scheme in light of its effects on the
uninsured. Part IV examines the adoption of a single payer system while
recognizing less sweeping approaches that some commentators have
advanced to address the immediate concern of paying for the uninsured.
The mechanics of shifting our current system to that of a single
payer system, or implementation of any other plan to overhaul our health
care payment system, is a topic beyond the scope of this article. Such a
massive structural change would be onerous, but preferable to forced
change in the event of the current system's eventual collapse. Quoting
Bill Clinton once again, "[lt]he general point I want to make is that I
think profound change has happened in societies when essentially people
understand that the cost of staying with the present course of action is
greater than the cost of change; that the risks of staying with the present
course of action are greater than the uncertain risks of change."
18
Although additional federal funding or some stopgap state response
could address disparate treatment of the uninsured, this would merely
ameliorate a symptom in the short term, while preventing treatment for
the underlying systemic failure.
H. THE HEALTH CARE PAYMENT SYSTEM WAS NOT DESIGNED, IT
EVOLVED
Our health care funding system was not developed in a planned,
rational manner, but evolved over time to an incredibly complex and
inefficient form.' 9 The overcharging of uninsured patients was not a
planned occurrence, but developed through this evolution. Some of the
legislative reforms that have taken place in the past two decades address
issues such as access to emergency care for people unable to pay for
their treatment, 20 and health insurance portability. 2' Although these
18. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 24 (statement of President William J. Clinton).
19. See generally, PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE (1982).
20. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd (2000).
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efforts have ameliorated certain immediate health care access issues,
they do not address other systemic issues that have developed. Our
current system has been built upon a foundation ill equipped to support
the end result, and now operates not unlike a Rube Goldberg machine.22
As one scholar put it, "[t]he current reform trend we have undertaken is
like putting a band aid on a gun shot wound. 23  Following is a brief
history of the evolution of our health care payment system followed by
an examination of some of the inefficiencies that have developed.
24
A. History of our Current Payment System
Health care insurance in the United States has a relatively short
history.25  Prior to the development of private health insurance,
Americans paid for health insurance out-of-pocket or with bartered
goods.26 The structure and evolution of our health care system in
21. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7(c) (2000).
22. Rube Goldberg was a famous cartoonist who is best remembered for his "Rube
Goldberg machines," excessively complex machines that perform simple tasks in an indirect
and tortuous manner. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1028 (1988). A
more generous description of the intricacies of our health care financing systems describes
any changes in regulating it as
tricky because of the dual markets for medical care. Health care is paid for by both
private dollars, through employer health plans and private insurance, and
government dollars, through programs like Medicare and Medicaid. An intricate
web of regulations and incentives define the government health care programs.
Tugging on a strand to close one loophole risks unraveling another strand of
regulations and private market incentives elsewhere in the system, compromising
the overall scheme. Program changes must be made deliberately, not reactively, to
avoid unintended results that endanger the nation's overall health care system.
Elizabeth A. Weeks, Gauging the Cost of Loopholes: Health Care Pricing and Medicare
Regulation in the Post-Enron Era, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1215, 1219-20 (2005).
23. Roche, supra note 2, at 1038.
24. Atul Gawande, a surgeon and New Yorker Magazine staff writer, weighed in on this
subject in an op-ed piece in the New York Times. Dr. Gawande notes that most Americans are
somewhat satisfied with their health care coverage and would not be enthusiastic about the
costs and inconvenience associated with rehabilitating our system. Dr. Gawande is concerned
that our nation will wait until the system's eventual collapse, as we had done with the
problems inherent in our banking schemes which precipitated the Great Depression. Atul
Gawande, Op-Ed., Can this Patient be Saved?, NEW YORK TIMES, May 5, 2007, at A13.
25. The history of medicine in this nation is also an interesting story. The development
of the profession and our hospital system is a surprising story, revealing that both are well
respected notwithstanding their relatively short history. See STARR, supra note 19.
26. Lewis D. Soloman & Tricia Asaro, Community-Based Health Care: A Legal and
Policy Analysis, 24 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 235, 237 (1997). Long ago, dispensaries provided
free health care in an era where medicine was not nearly as an exacting science, before the
2007]
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general had much to do with economics in the development of our
hospital-based system. In an effort to protect the economic interests of
the medical profession, originally there was a split between the efforts of
physicians and public health departments in the treatment of disease.27
In response to the Great Depression, which left many Americans unable
to pay for medical services, and left hospitals facing financial
difficulties, several hospitals developed plans to provide "a more
,,28 opredictable flow of revenue. One of these plans was Blue Cross,
29
which began operating in 1929 in Dallas, Texas.
Under the Blue Cross plan, the Baylor University Hospital initially
agreed to provide teachers with twenty-one days of hospital care a year
for $6 per person. 30 The Blue Cross plan expanded to allow any person
or group to purchase insurance regardless of their medical history.
3
'
These plans were tax-exempt because they provided medical coverage to
the general population. 32  Other hospitals began to implement similar
plans, and eventually hospitals joined to form many different plans.33
Around this same time, private health insurance plans were also
developed.34 These early private health plans limited their financial risks
by offering three general kinds of medical benefits: indemnity benefits,
service benefits, and direct services.35
Indemnity benefits reimbursed the subscriber for medical expenses
but usually did not include the entire medical bill.36 Under this type of
plan, the subscriber would submit their medical claims for
"germ theory" of disease was developed. Students from medical schools volunteered and
provided free care in exchange for an opportunity to practice their diagnostic skills. Patients
in dispensaries faced incredibly long lines to see a practitioner and then more lines to have any
resulting prescription filled. Critics of the system at the time were outraged that the mostly
poor people seeking care were getting "something for nothing." The dispensary system seems
to have been replaced as the provider of last resort with the current use of emergency rooms as
places for "free treatment." See STARR, supra note 19, at 182-83.
27. Public health efforts were restricted during this period to their "sanitarian" role of
protecting the public's health from filth and not becoming involved with treatment of any
resulting disease, so as not to interfere with the income of physicians. STARR, supra note 19,
at 195-97.
28. Id. at 295.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Soloman & Asaro, supra note 26, at 237.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., id.; STARR, supra note 19, at 296.
34. STARR, supra note 19, at 297.
35. Id. at291.
36. Id.
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reimbursement.37 This greatly limited the amount of contact between the
hospital and the insurer, which resulted in the insurer having no
responsibility for the quality of medical services the insured received.38
Indemnity plans limited their liability by requiring the insured to pay an
initial deductible and a share of the costs, thus providing incentive to
reduce the insured's use of services. 3
9
Service benefits guaranteed payment for services directly to the
physician or hospital, and usually covered the bill completely.4 ° Under
these plans, the treating physician or hospital submitted a claim for
reimbursement directly to the insurance provider.41 This also resulted in
the insurance provider and the medical provider entering into periodic
42negotiations. Insurance providers also used these periodic negotiations
as a way to control their costs and liabilities.43
Around the time that the imposition of the doctrine of informed
consent changed the manner in which physicians began interacting with
their patients, direct services plans created more involvement between
the medical provider and the insurance provider than did indemnity
benefit plans or service benefit plans. 44 Direct services plans are "the
provision of health services to the [insured party] by the organization
receiving prepayment., 45 This type of organization is responsible for the
quality of services provided because the doctors are integrated with the
same organization that enrolls the insured parties.46
Blue Shield was later established to compete with these commercial
health plans.47 Blue Shield created plans to pay for physician care by
Blue Cross, which provided for hospital coverage. Blue Shield
originally reimbursed physicians for the full cost of services.48 Group
practice associations also began to evolve around this time. 49 A group-
practice association consisted of several physicians who banded together
37. Id.
38. STARR, supra note 19, at 291.
39. Id. at 291-92.
40. Id. at 291.
41. Id. at 292.
42. STARR, supra note 19, at 292.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 291.
46. STARR, supra note 19, at 292.
47. Solomon & Asaro, supra note 26, at 238.
48. Id. at 238-39.
49. Id. at 239.
20071
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and agreed to provide care to certain people for a pre-arranged fee.5°
Before World War II, Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans were the
dominant type of health insurance.5' After World War II, commercial
insurers began using better marketing techniques and more competitive
pricing. 52 Soon, during the post-war period, commercial insurers began
to control the industry.53
Today, there are three basic health insurance models: the fee-for-
service model (FFS), the preferred provider organization (PPO), and the
health maintenance organization (HMO). In the FFS model, which is
the rarest of the three,54 health care providers receive a fee for each
service they provide.55 A PPO, on the other hand, "integrates the health
care financing function with the health care delivery system.
56
Subscribers to a PPO must choose from a limited list of medical
providers, making it more effective for a PPO to oversee its providers.57
Finally, an HMO is a "risk-bearing managed plan which further
integrates health care financing and health care delivery. 58 HMOs often
pay providers on a fixed payment basis rather than each time a patient
visits the doctor's office. 59 HMOs may be for-profit or not-for-profit.
60
With the transition of many major health care insurers to for-profit
organizations, there have been corresponding changes in our health care
payment system. Using a profit model, and through consolidation and
merger of larger patient bases, insurers can theoretically negotiate
contracts with hospitals and hospital systems using their large patient
base to negotiate the lowest possible payments. As discussed below,
these potentially lower payments have not resulted in lower health care
costs in general or lower prices to the consumer. Lower payments by
third party payers might have even exacerbated the need of health care
providers to seek greater payment return from patients who have no
power to bargain in advance for a discount from a hospital's list price.
50. Id.
51. Solomon & Asaro, supra note 26, at 239.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 240.
55. Solomon & Asaro, supra note 26, at 240.
56. Id. at241.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Solomon & Asaro, supra note 26, at 241.
60. Id. at 242.
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B. The Hospital List Price and Pricing Disparities
Disparate pricing for the uninsured has been well documented and
rigorously challenged by consumer advocates, litigators, and scholars.6 1
The price paid by the uninsured has often been so inflated, as compared
to the bulk of the payments received from third-party payers, that this
disparity has been deemed both medically and legally unethical.
The phenomenon of the uninsured patient paying so much more
than is typically reimbursed by third-party payers comes from the
practice of hospitals maintaining a list price. One commentator
compared hospital list prices to hotel "rack rates," usually displayed on a
chart on the back of each hotel room's door.6 2 These rates almost
always reflect a rate much higher than what any customer actually pays
for the room. Hospitals usually bill all patients at the list price for the
same service, and then significantly discount these rates for third-party
payers who contract with the hospital.63 Uninsured patients and third-
party payers who do not contract with the hospital may or may not
receive a discount from this price.64 In any event, the uninsured are far
more likely to pay the list price than patients who have insurance
coverage, and, on the average, the uninsured pay more than all other
65patients.
A self-paying patient, the patient who is most likely unable to
afford medical insurance, might pay as much as four times more for the
same procedure as compared to third-party payers.66 Nationwide, the
61. See, e.g., George A. Nation II, Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of
Unconscionability and Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94 KY. L.J. 101 (2005); Hugh F.
"Trey" Daly III et al., Into the Red to Stay in the Pink: The Hidden Cost of Being Uninsured,
12 HEALTH MATRIX 39 (2002); Beverly Cohen, The Controversy over Hospital Charges to
the Uninsured - No Villains, No Heroes, 51 VILL. L. REV. 95 (2006).
62. Hospital Pricing and the Uninsured: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 50 (2004) (statement of Glen Melnick, Ph.D.,
Director, Center for Health Financing, Policy and Management, University of Southern
California) [hereinafter Melnick Statement].
63. Id.
64. Although some of the uninsured do not pay the list rate, they usually pay
significantly more than any other patient. If uninsured patients are offered discounts, it is
usually on an ad hoc basis and varies by hospital, or even within hospitals. Exhibit 1 of Glenn
Melnick's testimony, see id., compares the average list price for an appendectomy in
California hospitals with the amounts actually paid by patients with various levels of
insurance.
65. Id.
66. Randy Suttles & Merrill Matthews, Hospital Pricing: Separate and Unequal,
HEALTH CARE NEWS (Heartland Inst., Chicago, Ill.), Sept. 1, 2003, available at
http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artld=12775.
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uninsured paid on average over three times as much as the federal
government pays to reimburse hospitals for the same treatment.67 The
amount charged to the uninsured patient varies depending on several
factors, including region of the nation, whether the hospital is in an
urban or rural area, the size of the facility, and whether the hospital is
for-profit or not-for-profit.68
Patients arriving at hospitals are not usually apprised of the charges
for various procedures, but are billed later at the hospital's list price.
This does not present as much of a problem for insured patients, as
health insurance providers usually have already negotiated a discount
from the list price. Hospitals simply bill third party payers at that
discounted rate; but, too often, hospitals directly bill uninsured patients
at the full list price.
Hospital list prices have been rising faster than inflation.69  The
rapid rise of the list price can affect prices paid by third-party payers, as
the list price is usually the basis for their discounted rate. ° Other than
acting as a reference for the discounted rates, which make up the bulk of
the actual payments to a hospital, these prices do not reflect the reality of
what a hospital expects to recover from these over inflated charges.
Reimbursement rates for the overwhelming majority of hospital services
are significantly discounted. For example, in California, Medicare pays
a discounted rate of about 27% of the list prices.71 Medicare's target is
to pay hospitals 1% above their actual costs, but the national average is
currently closer to 3.9%.72 Comparatively, managed care payers on
67. Gerard F. Anderson, From 'Soak The Rich' To 'Soak The Poor': Recent Trends In
Hospital Aricing, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 780, 781 (2007). This study also notes that the
disparity in the charges to uninsured patients versus third party payers actually widened from
1984 through the period of study in 2004.
68. See infra Section II.B describing demographics of the uninsured.
69. Larry Grudzien, Can Consumer-Driven Health Care, Health Reimbursement
Arrangements and Health Savings Accounts Save Employer Sponsored Health Care From
Ruin?, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 39, 40 (2006) (citing GARY CLAXTON ET AL., THE KAISER
FAMILY FOUNDATION EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY: 2005 ANNUAL SURVEY 1
(2005), http://www.kff.org/insurance/7315/upload/7315.pdf).
70. Cohen, supra note 61, at 108-09. Although Medicare reimbursement is largely by
fixed rate, the fixed rate may be influenced by hospitals' list prices. Medicare reimbursement
for extraordinary patient cases ("outlier cases") is in proportion to the hospital's list price. Id.
at 109. See also Diane Miller Wolman & Wilhelmine Miller, The Consequences of
Uninsurance for Individuals, Families, Communities, and the Nation, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
397, 400 (2004).
71. Melnick Statement, supra note 62.
72. Suttles & Matthews, supra note 66.
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73average pay a discount rate of about 35% of the list prices. As over
90% of the payers for hospital services are paying significantly
discounted rates, charging uninsured patients the list price is not only on
its face unfair, but it also serves to grossly overstate the amount of bad
debt written off when these bills are uncollected, or in the case of not-
for-profit charitable hospitals, greatly inflates their provision of free care
to the community.74
The evolution of the nation's health care payment systems,
integrated with the ever-increasing federal share of providing health care
through direct and indirect federal subsidies, has evolved into a system
where a hospital's list price is relatively meaningless. The list price
continues to rise, expanding the share paid by governments and other
third party payers, but the list price itself grows at a rate much faster in
real dollars than these discount rates, further penalizing the uninsured.
The list price is paid by only a small fraction of a hospital's payers:
the uninformed and/or the uninsured. The rates are so high that they
have spawned litigation and both federal and state legislative efforts to
alter this pricing inequity. The inequities inherent in this pricing scheme
should be of concern for all citizens, as the largest share of the burden of
providing this care falls to the federal government, and ultimately the
taxpayer.
C. Federal Health Care Expenditures
The federal government is already, by far, the largest provider of
health care funding through its many insurance programs and tax
incentives. Most people are familiar with some of the programs through
which the federal government pays for medical treatment, such as the
Medicare and Medicaid programs, but there are also other indirect
federal subsidies.75
The federal government is the largest funding source for health care
in the United States as a direct third-party payer. Of the approximately
73. Melnick Statement, supra note 62.
74. One district court examined such issues in Kizzire v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc., 343
F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1075 (N.D. Ala. 2004).
75. Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the United States: A Proposal for a
More Functional System, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 16-17 (2005). Note that the
employees are also not taxed for this valuable benefit. See also KAISER COMM'N ON
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER, KEY FACTS ABOUT
AMERICANS WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE, 2-3 (2006), available at
http://kff.org/uninsured/upload/745 I.pdf [hereinafter KAISER COMM'N PRIMER].
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84.4% of the American population (243.3 million people) who had
health insurance in 2003, 31% were insured by the federal government.
76
Approximately 76.8 million people were covered directly by
government-paid health insurance programs.77 Medicare is the federal
program which helps pay health care costs for people age sixty-five and
older and for certain people under the age of sixty-five with
disabilities.78 Medicare alone covers more than 39.5 million people.79
Medicaid is a program funded jointly by federal and state governments,
and is administered at the state level to provide medical assistance to the
needy. 80 Medicaid covered about 35.6 million Americans in 2003.81
Federal dollars for health care are not spent exclusively on the poor
or retired. Private health insurance, such as coverage purchased by an
individual from a private health insurance company or coverage from a
health plan provided through an employer or union,82 is also heavily
subsidized through the employment tax exclusion for insurance
premiums paid by employers. 83 Employment-based health insurance is
coverage offered through a relative's or one's own employment.84
About 60.4% of the people with private insurance were covered by
76. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & ROBERT J. MILLS, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2003, at 14 (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p60-226.pdf.
This 31% included individuals insured by Medicare, Medicaid, and veterans and military
health care.
77. Id.
78. The Third Circuit describes Medicare as follows:
The federal Medicare program, administered by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services of the United States Department of Health and Human Services,
is the largest public program financing health care services for the aged and
disabled. Hospitals that provide services to Medicare patients are reimbursed for
their expenses under Title XVII of the Social Security Act (the "Medicare Act"), 42
U.S.C. § 1395 et seq. Part A of the Medicare Act authorizes payment to
participating hospitals ("providers") for their direct and indirect costs of providing
inpatient care to beneficiaries. 42 C.F.R. § 413.9(a), (b). Medicare also reimburses
teaching hospitals for the costs of graduate medical education, including physician
time for instructing and supervising interns and residents. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h).
Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 142, 144 (3d Cir. 2004).
79. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 76, at 14.
80. Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Planning's Greatest Gap: Funding Long-Tern Care,
II LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 407, 422 (2007).
,1. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 76, at 14.
82. Id. at 14.
83. Hermer, supra note 75, at 17. Note that the employees are also not taxed for this
valuable benefit. See also KAISER COMM'N PRIMER, supra note 75, at 2-3.
84. Id.
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employment-based health insurance in 2003,85 while others chose to
provide their own coverage through direct-purchase plans. Direct-
purchase health insurance is coverage through a plan purchased by an
individual from a private company.86 In 2003, 9.2% of the privately
insured were covered by direct-purchase insurance.
87
Federal income tax subsidies, which allow individuals to deduct
health benefit contributions 88 and health care expenses exceeding 7.5%
of their adjusted gross income,89 totaled approximately $188.5 billion in
2004, more than was spent on the Medicare program that year.90 Over
one-fourth of these tax benefits inured to families with annual incomes
of $100,000 or more, who account for about 14% of the population.91
Although the federal government does not actually pay for this care, it
permits the above deductions and hence a reduction in these taxpayers'
tax bills, effectively shifting the cost to the federal government. Most
people recognize that health care is government subsidized for the very
poorest, but many do not realize that the federal government also
subsidizes health care for people with greater than average incomes.
Federal and state governments are also the primary source for
funding uncompensated care through a variety of programs.92 In 2004,
85. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 76, at 14 fig.5.
86. Id. at 14.
87. Id. at 16 fig.5.
88. An employee is not subject to tax on the value of health insurance benefits provided
by an employer. I.R.C. §§ 105(b), 105(g), 106(a) (2000). Internal Revenue Code § 106
excludes employer provided health care insurance from employer's income.
89. See I.R.C. § 213 (2000) (providing for a deduction of medical expenses not
compensated for by insurance if the expenses exceed 7.5% of a person's adjusted gross
income).
90.
The tax expenditure for health benefits is the amount of revenues that the federal
government forgoes by exempting health benefits and spending from the federal
income and Social Security taxes, including (1) employer health benefit
contributions for workers and retirees, (2) health benefit deductions for the self-
employed, (3) health spending under flexible spending plans, and (4) the tax
deduction for health expenses .... Families with incomes of $100,000 or more (14
percent of the population) account for 26.7 percent of all health benefit tax
expenditures.
John Sheils & Randall Haught, The Cost of Tax-Exempt Health Benefits in 2004, HEALTH
AFFAIRS W4-106, W4-106 (Web Exclusive, Feb. 25, 2004),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.106v I .pdf.
91. Id.
92. JACK HADLEY & JOHN HOLAHAN, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, THE COST OF CARE FOR THE UNINSURED: WHAT DO WE SPEND, WHO PAYS,
AND WHAT WOULD FULL COVERAGE ADD TO MEDICAL SPENDING? 3 (2004),
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/The-Cost-of-Care-for-the-Uninsured-What-Do-We-
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the federal government paid for roughly 85%, or $34.6 billion, of
uncompensated care provided by hospitals. 93 In one such program, the
federal Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital Payment Program
("DSH"), payments totaled $17.4 billion in 2004.94 DSH payments are
paid to hospitals that serve a disproportionate number of Medicaid
patients because of the areas in which the hospitals are located. DSH
payments aim to offset the low, discounted rates that these hospitals
receive for treating Medicaid patients. State Medicaid DSH payments
totaled $1.8 billion for the same year.95 Payments totaling $7.9 billion
were also made to hospitals from state and local tax appropriations for
their provision of charity care.96
Direct service programs on the federal level also funded care for the
uninsured, paying $6.1 billion to health care providers for
uncompensated medical care, and state direct service programs paid $1.4
billion in 2004. 97 Medicare also ensures that health care providers are
credited for unpaid, uncollectible Medicare deductibles or co-insurance,
if providers make reasonable collection efforts. 98
The value of the uncompensated care that is federally subsidized
through direct programs, such as DSH, and through hidden subsidies
calls into question the level of discount hospitals offer to governmental
and private insurers. Artificially high list prices could not have been
designed merely to overcharge the uninsured. Some authors postulate
that hospitals purposely inflate these fee schedules to maximize returns
not only from the uninsured, but also on all discounted rates.99 One
hospital's chief financial officer commented:
For some payors and for some services, "usual, customary, and reasonable"
limits do not exist. Often an insurer that does not have a contract with a
Spend-Who-Pays-and-What-Would-Full-Coverage-Add-to-Medical-Spending.pdf.
93. Id.
94. Id. The fact that a high percentage of Medicare patients require additional funding
for hospitals lends support to the idea that the reimbursement rates by these Medicare and
Medicaid funding may be too low. Hermer, supra note 75, at 74 (citing Theresa A. Coughlin
et al., States' Use of UPL and DSH Financing Mechanisms, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS, 245, 246-47
(2004), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/23/2/245).
95. HADLEY & HOLAHAN, supra note 92, at 3 fig.3.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Nation IH, supra note 61, at 121 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 413.80(e)(2)).
99. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Paying for What You Get and Getting What You Pay for:
Legal Responses to Consumer-Driven Health Care, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2006,
at 159; Barry F. Rosen & Christopher D. Scott, Back to the Future - Are Tax-Exempt
Hospitals Headed for the Good Old Days?, MD. BAR J., March/April 2006, at 35.
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provider or that pays a percentage of charges will have to pay the hospital in
proportion to its charges. Therefore, the higher the hospital's charge, the
higher the payment. Because of this reality, charges for many hospitals are
irrationally high and not based on underlying costs, relative value units or a
reasonable multiple of a standard fee schedule, such as Medicare. Charges are
set artificially high to maximize payments. t00
The fact that the federal government offers incentive payments to
hospitals that care for a disproportionate share of Medicare and
Medicaid patients is some evidence that the discount rate is too low.
Our current health care payment scheme has evolved to a point
where the federal government is responsible for protecting the health of
the elderly through Medicare and the very poor through Medicaid. The
federal government also provides tax incentives to employers that offer
health insurance to their workers, helping to ensure coverage for a
majority of workers. Other laws prohibit denying an uninsured at least
some minimal form of emergency treatment if needed.'0 '
III. THE CURRENT HEALTH CARE PAYMENT SYSTEM'S INEQUITIES AND
INEFFICIENCIES
The inequities of the list price, in combination with other anomalies
in our health care payment system, place the most substantial burden on
the uninsured. So who are the ones left without health care coverage in
the United States? The uninsured are not likely to be the poorest, and
are not divided evenly by age, race, or geographic location. They are
most likely to be the young and the working poor. The lack of access to
health care, and the exorbitant prices often charged when they access the
health care system, point to the system's inequities. The inefficiencies
of the system were caused, in many cases, by efforts to help solve the
inequities. In addition, promised efficiencies stemming from open
competition in the health care system have not been realized.
A. Inequities of the List Price
Charging patients who are least likely to be able to pay many times
the cost of what is normally expected for the same service is, on its face,
unethical. It is well documented that much of this debt remains
100. Ray B. Lefton, What's it Worth?, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Dec. 2003, at 61.
101. See discussion of EMTALA infra Part I.C.
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uncollected. 0 2  According to the American Hospital Association, debt
from un-reimbursed care totaled $22.3 billion at 4927 United States
hospitals in 2002.103 According to a leading health care lawyer,
"'[h]ospitals typically write off 70% of self-pay revenue to bad debt, and
collect only 30%.... If they do it right, they can flip those numbers.'""°4
Other sources report that as little as 10% of this debt is collectible.105
Hospitals also report, however, that self-paying patients, a tiny
portion of their total patients, account for a disproportionate amount of
their "profits."' 0 6 Counting on the uninsured to support the bottom line
by paying the highest rate of any patients serves to make access to health
care even more difficult, and ultimately less effective, for people who
cannot afford health insurance. Uninsured people often can afford less
treatment, and may defer treatment until later stages of a disease's
progression, often resulting in the most expensive and least efficient way
to treat health care problems. 107
The inflated bills to the uninsured are not the only debts that may
be uncollected and written off by health care providers. Adding in other
forms of payment made directly by patients, including insured patients'
102. See, e.g., Edward J. Larson & Marc Dettmann, The Impact of HSAS on Health Care
Reform: Preliminary Results After One Year, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1087, 1121 (2005);
Nina J. Crimm, Do Fiduciary Duties Contained in Federal Tax Laws Effectively Promote
National Health Care Policies and Practices?, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 125, 142 n.66 (2005);
Robin Locke Nagele & Catherine A. Pajakinas, Charity Care Class Action is Denied Federal
Status, HEALTH LAW., Mar. 2005, at 1, 3.
103. AHC Media LLC, Are Nonprofit Hospitals Preying on the Uninsured?, MED.
ETHICS ADVISOR, Dec. 2004, available at
http://www.ahcpub.com/hot-topics/?htid=l &httid=l 610.
104. Chris Rauber, Chain Reactions, HEALTHLEADERS, Aug. 2003, (quoting Michael
Zimmerman, the "CEO of Hales Corners .... a revenue-cycle-management consulting,
research and publishing company") available at
http://www.healthleadersmedia.comlmagazine/view-magazine-feature.cfm?content-id=4730
2.
105. Jonathan Maze, Hospitals Under Assault over Billing of Uninsured Patients, THE
POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Sept. 11, 2004, at IA.
106. Both for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals appear to count on self paying patients
for their "profits," simply meaning the amount of funds remaining after all expenses have
been paid. "Data from one California hospital system showed that, although uninsured and
walk-in patients accounted for less than two percent of the patient population, they accounted
for as much as thirty-five percent of the chain's total profits." E. Haavi Morreim, Consumer-
Defined Health Plans: Emerging Challenges from Tort and Contract, 39 J. HEALTH L. 307,
342 (2006).
107. Wolman & Miller, supra note 70, at 399. This is likely due to their ability to access
health care professionals without providing proof or ability to pay because the federal law
forbids hospitals turning away patients in certain emergency situations. Gunnar, supra note 2,
at 155.
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deductibles and bills exceeding a patient's coverage, hospitals wrote off
approximately $22 billion in 2003.108 The remarkably high default rate
alone reveals that our health care payment system has serious structural
issues.
B. Who are the Uninsured?
In 2004, 45.8 million people in the United States (15.7% of the
population) did not have health insurance for the entire year.109 This is
an increase from 2002, when 43.6 million Americans were without
health insurance. 110  Many of these uninsured people sought and
received some form of medical treatment.
In 2004, a total of $1.5 trillion was spent on health care.11'
Uncompensated medical care represented 2.7% of the total amount spent
on health care.' 12 This uncompensated care makes up over $40 billion,
or one-third, of medical care provided to the uninsured.'1 3 Adults who
were uninsured for the full year received 65%, or $26.3 billion, of
uncompensated care.' 14 Children who were uninsured for the full year
received $3.6 billion in uncompensated medical care." 5
1. Demographics of the Uninsured
If so many U.S. citizens of limited means have some access to
health care through a federal, state, or local program, then who are the
uninsured? Health care coverage is not equally distributed among the
various racial and cultural groups in the United States. Many scholars
have reported on the disparities in medical treatment in the United States
based on race; access to health care insurance is only one small part of
this problem. 16 In 2003, Hispanics were more likely to be uninsured
108. Rauber, supra note 104. The underinsured may be insured, but may have used up
the extent of their benefits; or, alternatively may be insured at the outset of an illness, but may
lose coverage due to their inability to work and then become uninsured. Mary Crossely,
Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 147-48
(2005).
109. DENAVAS-WALT, ET AL., supra note 76, at 16.
110. Id. at 14.
111. HADLEY & HOLAHAN, supra note 92, at 2.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. HADLEY & HOLAHAN, supra note 92, at 2 fig.2.
116. See, e.g., Lisa C. Ikemoto, In the Shadow of Race: Women of Color in Health
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than any other racial group."17 Approximately 13.2 million Hispanics
were without health insurance in 2003.' 18 This is an increase from 2002,
when 12.8 million Hispanics were without health insurance." 9
Approximately 32.7% of Hispanics were uninsured, as opposed to
19.6% of blacks 120 and 14.6% of whites.
121
Younger Americans are more likely to be uninsured than other
Americans. More people ages 18-24 were uninsured than any other age
group; 122 30.2% of the people in this age group were uninsured in
2003.123 People aged 25-34 are also highly likely to be uninsured, with
about 26.4% having no coverage in 2003.124 Children under the age of
18 are also more likely to be uninsured, even in spite of the many federal
and state programs created to provide health care coverage for
children; 125 about 11.4% of children under the age of 18 were uninsured
in 2003.126 It is difficult to calculate how many people could have
afforded health insurance but chose to remain uninsured. This practice
appears to be more common among younger Americans, who may have
more of a sense of invulnerability to disease and age.
The number of uninsured people also varies according to
geographic region of the nation. The South had the highest proportion
Disparities Policy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1023 (2006); Mary Crossley, Infected Judgment:
Legal Responses to Physician Bias, 48 VILL. L. REV. 195 (2003); Michael S. Shin, Redressing
Wounds: Finding a Legal Framework to Remedy Racial Disparities in Medical Care, 90
CAL. L. REV. 2047 (2002); M. Gregg Bloche, Race and Discretion in American Medicine, 1
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 95 (2001); Ren6 Bowser, Racial Profiling in Health
Care: An Institutional Analysis of Medical Treatment Disparities, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 79
(2001); Barbara A. Noah, Racial Disparities in the Delivery of Health Care, 35 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 135 (1998).
117. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 76, at 15.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. These are the terms used to identify these populations in the original sources.
121. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 76, at 15.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. Of course, some of these people can afford health insurance and choose instead
not to pay for it. This phenomenon is especially prevalent among young adults.
125. For example, the State Children's Health Insurance Program provides matching
federal funds to states that provide health insurance coverage for uninsured children. The
Balanced Budget Act provided $40 billion over ten years to help states expand health care to
children. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd (2000) (amended by Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(2000)), cited in Sean A.C. Courtney, Children's Health Insurance Program in Mississippi:
Enrollment Barriers and Opportunities for Increased Access, 70 MiSS. L.J. 983, 984-85
(2001).
126. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 76, at 15.
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of uninsured in 2003, with 18% of people lacking health insurance. 127
The Midwest, with 12% of its population uninsured, had the lowest rate
of uninsured people.
128
Economics are also an indicator of who is likely to be uninsured.
Households with less than $25,000 in annual income were less likely to
have health insurance than any other income bracket; approximately
24.2% of people making $25,000 a year or less were uninsured in
2003.129 Surprisingly, more than eight out of ten uninsured come from
working families with one or more full time workers. 130 Families with
part-time workers made up about 12% of the uninsured, and families
with no working members made up about 19% of the uninsured.'13 The
people most likely to be without health insurance are also less likely to
be politically powerful. People who lack health coverage, or lack
consistent health coverage, not only receive worse health care, but also
as a group have poorer health.
132
2. Bankruptcy Issues of the Uninsured33
Although they may not qualify for a government-funded health
insurance plan, many uninsured families of limited means also have
financial difficulty paying other monthly bills.' 34  The addition of
medical bills to these families' debts may create serious financial
constraints for them. When medical bills are not paid, hospitals and
doctors often turn the debt over to a collection agency, which may harm
a person's credit history. 35 This damage to their credit will further
interfere with their ability to pay, as he or she will then likely pay higher
interest rates in the unlikely event they are able to secure financing to
pay these debts. About 23% of uninsured people in 2003 reported they
were contacted by a collection agency.136
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. KAISER COMM'N PRIMER, supra note 75, at 4.
131. Id. at 19.
132. Hermer, supra note 75, at 2-3.
133. The academic discussion of health care costs and bankruptcies is largely based upon
the pre-2005 Bankruptcy Code analysis and issues. Prospectively, these problems may be
further exacerbated by changes in the laws that make individual Chapter 7 bankruptcy more
difficult.
134. KAISER COMM'N PRIMER, supra note 75, at 8.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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Uninsured and underinsured patients make up a substantial portion
of the many people who seek protection of the bankruptcy laws in the
United States. 37  In 2001, approximately 1.5 million bankruptcy
petitions were filed. 138 Medical reasons contributed to roughly half of
all personal bankruptcies filed in the United States in 2001, according to
a study by Harvard University's law and medical schools. 139  This
represented a substantial increase from just two years prior, when a
similar 1999 study revealed that only 25% of the respondents had
indicated that medical reasons led to their bankruptcy. 1
40
In another 2001 study, 1771 personal bankruptcy filers in five
federal courts answered a questionnaire regarding their reasons for filing
bankruptcy.' 4 ' Almost half of them indicated that medical problems led
to their bankruptcy.142 More than one-fourth said illness or injury was
the specific reason for filing bankruptcy. 143 A lapse of insurance during
a medical problem was also responsible for many bankruptcy filings;
slightly over 38% of those who filed bankruptcy because of major
medical problems experienced a lapse in their medical insurance.144
Other uninsured patients who cannot pay their medical bills may
not file for bankruptcy, but may be deemed "judgment-proof' and may
not be pursued for payment. '45 These losses might also be written off by
a hospital. The greater these patients' hospital bills are inflated, the
greater the benefit will be to the hospital at tax time, or when calculating
a hospital's charitable contributions to the community.
People forced into bankruptcy after suffering an injury or illness are
likely to default not only on their obligations to pay their medical bills,
137. The effect of being uninsured and the interaction between hospital charges and
bankruptcy is not clear. Multiple other factors must be considered in attempting to establish
any causal connection. A recent empirical study revealed that there are factors beyond
hospital overcharging that contribute to the intersection of these issues. See Melissa B. Jacoby
& Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An Alternative Account of Medical-
Related Financial Distress, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 535 (2006).
138. David U. Himmelstein et al., MarketWatch: Illness and Injury as Contributors to
Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFFAIRS W5-63, W5-63 (Web Exclusive, Feb. 2, 2005),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.63v I.pdf.
139. Id.
140. Elizabeth Warren et al., Medical Problems and Bankruptcy Filings, Norton
Bankruptcy Law Adviser (May 2000).
141. See Jacoby & Warren, supra note 137, at 545.
142. Himmelstein et al., supra note 138, at W5-63.
143. Id. at W5-67.
144. Id.
145. It may make little sense for judgment proof debtors to file bankruptcy at all. Susan
Kovac, Judgment-Proof Debtors in Bankruptcy, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 675, 751 (1991).
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but on their other unsecured obligations as well. Unsecured creditor
debts are likely to be scheduled in bankruptcy filings precipitated by a
person's lack of health insurance, adding additional costs to society due
to his or her lack of healthcare coverage. Creditors usually write off
these additional debts, further increasing indirectly the federal
government's burden for costs accrued by the uninsured due to their lack
of health care coverage.
C. Competition in the Health Care System has not Produced a More
Efficient System
Conversion of many health care insurers and providers from not-
for-profit to for-profit entities was implemented in part to realize the
benefits and cost savings inherent in a free market system. The
economies of scale and other efficiencies of large for-profit health care
providers apparently have not driven down the cost of health care.
Health care premiums have continued to rise faster than the rate of
inflation. 146 The effects of an invisible hand controlling the costs of
health care have not been realized in this nation's health care payment
systems.
1. System-Wide, Cost Control has not Benefited from Competition.
The consumer price index rose 26% between the years of 1992 and
2001; during that same period, the increase for medical services
increased by about 47%. 147 While that comparison alone is intriguing,
during that same time, the cost of cosmetic surgery, largely excluded
from third party payer benefit plans and of limited availability, increased
by only 16%. 148 The laws of supply and demand do not appear to be
functioning efficiently among third-party payers in our current health
care payment system.
In spite of concerns about the financial health of our health care
system and concern over rapidly rising prices, it may be surprising to
learn that the profits for health insurance providers and HMOs actually
have risen in recent years. In 2004, six of the seven largest health
146. Hermer, supra note 75, at 29.
147. DEVON HERRICK, NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, WHY ARE HEALTH
COSTs RISING? 1 (2003) http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba/ba437/ba437.pdf.
148. Id.
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insurers experienced an increase in profits. 149 CIGNA and Aetna, two of
the largest providers, saw increases of 128% and 136%, respectively.
150
Highmark, Inc., a leading health insurer in the Pittsburgh area, saw its
profits nearly triple that same year. 15 1  Highmark's overall profits
reached $310.5 million in 2004.152
According to Weiss Ratings, Inc., a consumer advocacy
organization, HMOs also experienced an increase in their profits. In the
first half of 2004, HMOs earned $5.8 billion. 153 This represents a 31.9%
increase over their profits in the first half of 2003.'14
Of all the uninsured patient costs to hospitals, 35% are paid by the
uninsured patients out-of-pocket. 155 Services for which payment has not
been received are then labeled as uncompensated care. It is estimated
that government spending already covers about 85% of these costs, or
$34.6 billion, through the various direct and indirect programs
mentioned previously. 156  This share is likely to increase as more
uninsured Americans utilize the nation's emergency rooms as their only
access to a health care provider.
157
In 2001, over 60% of uncompensated care was provided in
hospitals. 158 The remaining care was provided almost equally by office-
based physicians and direct care programs and clinics. 159 Direct service
programs provided roughly 19% of uncompensated care and are partly
supported by government funds, but not to the same extent as
hospitals. 60 They received less than $8 billion in 2004.161
149. Robert Kazel, Managed Care Profits Up, Optimism for 2005 Strong, AMER. MED.
NEWS, Feb. 28, 2005, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2005/02/28/biscO228.htm.
150. Id.
151. Christopher Snowbeck, Health Insurer Profits Triple: Highmark's Higher Returns
Accompanied Higher Health Costs for Many Consumers, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZZETrE, Mar.
24, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05083/476795-28.stm.
152. Id.
153. Weiss Ratings Inc., 50% of HMOs Financially Strong as Profitability Continues,
http://www.weissratings.comlNews/InsHMO/20050207hmo.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
154. Id.
155. KAISER COMM'N PRIMER, supra note 75, at 8.
156. Id. at 9.
157. Most hospitals are prohibited from turning away a patient who presents with an
emergency condition but is unable to pay for medical care. Stephanie B. Livesay, Note, The
New EMTALA Regulations: The Wrong Prescription for Emergency Department Congestion,
3 APPALACHIAN J. L. 139, 139 (2004).
158. HADLEY & HOLAHAN, supra note 92, at 3.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
QLR
OVERCHARGING THE UNINSURED
The fact that many uninsured patients start out insured, and later
must personally pay for health care if they lose their job or reach the
limits of their policy coverage, makes calculating the payment inequity
for uninsured patients difficult. 162 Often a catastrophic illness will result
in the loss of a job, which then results in the loss of health insurance
coverage. Despite the opportunity to maintain continuous coverage
while employed, pursuant to HIPAA, 163  and after the loss of
employment, pursuant to COBRA,' 64 many are still financially unable to
take advantage of such an opportunity, especially those who are
unemployed for an extensive period.
2. Delays in Treatment Result in an Inefficient Use of Health Care
Funds
Many uninsured patients with minor medical problems delay
treatment, hoping that their medical needs will disappear, or they may
wait until the condition is emergent.1 65  Non-elderly insured people
generally had more than twice the amount of medical bills as uninsured
people in 2004.166 Per capita, insured patients incurred $2975 in medical
care costs while uninsured people incurred $1629. People without
health care are either remarkably healthy as a group, or are foregoing or
delaying treatment.
The federal statute prohibiting most hospitals from turning away
patients who lack an ability to pay but present at emergency rooms
makes these facilities the only available health care provider for many
uninsured.167 Many of these emergency room patients will never pay
162. Insured patients may also exhaust the limits of their coverage, making a portion of
their expenses uninsured. Melnick Statement, supra note 62.
163. "The Health Insurance Portability and Accessibility Act (HIPAA) bans outright
refusal of coverage to those seeking coverage in a group plan and significantly curtails the use
of preexisting condition restrictions." Hermer, supra note 75, at 12 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. §
300gg-41 (a)(I) (West 2005)).
164. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, commonly referred to as
COBRA, is federal legislation that mandates continuation of coverage under group health
plans for employees and their dependents who lose coverage by termination of employment or
otherwise. Andr6 Hampton, Markets, Myths, and a Man on the Moon: Aiding and Abetting
America's Flight from Health Insurance, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 987, 1004 n.75 (2000).
165. Gunnar, supra note 2, at 155.
166. Id. at 154.
167. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) was enacted
by Congress in 1986 as an attempt to reduce patient dumping, the practice of refusing to treat
uninsured patients. Under EMTALA, a hospital must provide any patient presented to the
emergency department with an appropriate medical screening, stabilizing treatment if any, and
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their resulting medical bills, as they may be judgment proof and refuse
to pay, or will be forced into bankruptcy by impossibly high debt.'
68
There is little incentive for hospitals to reduce the list price of treatments
for which they will never receive payment, yet these prices are not
grounded in any real sense of the actual cost or prevailing market rate of
these treatments. The ability to write off these debts, however, does
provide incentive to further inflate the list prices and hence the
uncollectible bills. Although it may seem that the inflation of these bills
is relatively harmless, as these debts will not likely be collected, this
shifts the cost for this highly inefficient care to the federal
government. 169
Patients who utilize emergency rooms in this manner either
squander the resources of an expensive treatment facility for less than
emergent conditions, or perhaps have waited until a condition that could
have been treated in a prophylactic manner by a primary care physician
becomes an actual emergency. 70  Either use is a waste of the nation's
health care resources.
People without health insurance also receive less preventive care
than those with insurance. These people are often diagnosed later, at a
time when a disease is at a more advanced stage. 17 ' Once diagnosed,
those without insurance receive less therapeutic care and have higher
mortality rates than those with insurance.172 EMTALA might have been
effective in stopping the practice of "patient dumping," but a more
an appropriate transfer under certain circumstances.
An appropriate medical screening must be provided to determine whether an
emergency medical condition exists. A hospital fulfills this requirement if it provides the
same treatment to one patient as it would to any other patient similarly situated. If an
emergency medical condition is found, the hospital must provide the patient with stabilizing
treatment. Stabilizing treatment must assure, within a reasonable medical probability, that
further deterioration of the emergent condition is prevented. Finally, a hospital may transfer
the patient to another medical facility if the transfer is approved by the accepting facility and
all necessary medical records are sent to the accepting facility. Qualified personnel with
appropriate medical equipment reasonably necessary for a safe transfer must conduct the
transfer. Unfortunately, many people without health insurance misuse hospital emergency
departments and EMTALA. Because hospitals are required to provide them with a basic
amount of medical care, uninsured people misuse the hospital emergency department to
receive primary care and not emergency care. See Livesay, supra note 157, at 139-43.
168. See Jacoby & Warren, supra note 137, at 535.
169. This practice may also shift these debts to the various state and local governments
that offer tax incentives to health care providers that render charitable services.
170. For a physician's perspective, see Gunnar, supra note 2, at 152-54.
171. HADLEY & HOLAHAN, supra note 92, at 4.
172. Id.
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efficient method of providing basic health care for the uninsured could
save the government significant money, considering the cost of treating
patients in an emergency room. 173
IV. FIXING THE IMMEDIATE CONCERN OR THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM
Adoption of a single payer system would be the optimal approach
for solving not only the problems of the uninsured, but for realizing
greater efficiency, cost savings, and fair access to health care. Although
other countries have managed to move from a private system to a single
payer system, this is unlikely to occur in the United States until our
current system suffers nearly complete collapse.174  In the meantime,
many patches to our current system have been instituted with various
degrees of success, but we are only prolonging the eventual collapse
with temporary fixes.
A. Is Any Plan of Universal Health Care Possible in the United States?
Until recently, hospitals have been unwilling to adjust their list
rates to reflect the actual value of services rendered to uninsured
patients. Recent bad press about this practice has given many
Americans pause to consider the inequities in our entire health care
payment system. 75 Many scholars believe the best solution would be to
create a national health insurance plan. 176 One commentator estimates
that, by providing health care coverage to people who had been without
173. There were cases of seriously hurt people being turned away from hospitals for their
lack of ability to pay; Congress quickly passed EMTALA in response to these horrible stories
of people being allowed to die, or of women in labor forced to travel great distances to find
help for their immediate needs. Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 879-80 (4th Cir.
1992). This need might have coincided with the end of many hospitals obligations to provide
free health care under the Hill-Burton Act, which provided financing for the construction of
hospitals with an obligation to provide health care services for the needy. See David E.
Mitchell, Recent Decision, EMTALA's Stabilization Requirement Does not Require Proof of
Improper Motive: Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 163, 167-68 (1999).
174. See Gawande, supra note 24.
175. See, e.g., MSNBC.com, Uninsured Patients Pay More for Care: Hospitals Charge
Up to Four Times More for Services, Experts Say, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5290172/
(last visited Nov. 1, 2007); David Lazarus, Uninsured Patient Billed More than $12,000 for
Broken Rib, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 30, 2007, at CI.
176. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR
PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE (2003); Hampton, supra
note 164, at 987; M. Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 919 (2002).
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insurance for a full year, the average spending per person on health care
would increase by approximately 70%, from $1629 to $2768.177 This
would increase medical care spending by a total of $48 billion. 178 It is
unclear how much of the uncompensated medical care is already written
off without being added to these estimates of the federal government's
current burden for such costs. Other savings could be realized by
encouraging treatment in primary care clinics instead of emergency
rooms.
Universal access to health care can improve the population's health
by providing preventive care and early diagnosis of disease.179 This
could avoid having to spend greater amounts of money to treat a
condition that has advanced to a more severe and costly stage. In turn,
patients would receive therapeutic care, possibly lowering mortality
rates. Conservative estimates indicate that nationwide health insurance
could offer a 5-15% reduction in mortality rates.1
80
Spending the additional $48 billion needed to provide nationwide
health insurance is a small amount compared to the amount the federal
government already spends on health care. Medicare cost approximately
$266.4 billion in 2004, and Medicaid cost $280.7 billion.' 8' As
previously stated, the tax subsidy for private insurance cost the federal
government an estimated $188.5 billion in 2004.182 Putting these dollar
figures into perspective, the additional $48 billion would increase the
share of the GDP already going to health care by only 0.4%.183
Proponents of universal health care look to existing models in
Canada and in Europe to support adoption of such a system in the United
States. In Germany, the government achieves universal healthcare by
obligating its citizens to secure public insurance coverage, typically
provided for by a deduction from their earnings, based on their income
and not on their health risk or family size. People whose income falls
below a certain range must purchase this insurance. People with higher
incomes may elect a private insurance plan, although about 60% of them
still choose the public plan anyway.184 Health expenditures in European
177. HADLEY & HOLAHAN, supra note 92, at 5.
178. Id.
179. Hermer, supra note 75, at 3.
180. HADLEY & HOLAHAN, supra note 92, at 6.
181. Id.
182. Id. (citing Sheils & Haught, supra note 90, at W4-106).
183. HADLEY & HOLAHAN, supra note 92, at 6.
184. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can't We Do What They Do? National Health Reform
Abroad, 32 J.L. MED & ETHIcS 433, 433-34 (2004).
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countries are about half of what is spent on health care in the United
States per capita (as expressed as a percentage of GDP), yet life
expectancy in the United States is lower than in the United Kingdom,
Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands. Infant mortality rates in the
United States also exceed those in the countries mentioned above. 185
Those who claim that Americans would be unwilling to give up the
"best health care" available to adopt universal health care may be
making such a claim under a false premise. Although Americans with
limitless resources may be able to get the best care available, the health
care that most Americans receive is actually inferior in many respects to
that of other countries, notwithstanding that the United States spends
about twice as much as any other nation per capita on health care.186 In
spite of our willingness to spend more per capita on health care, we rank
poorly as measured against other leading nations on factors such as
quality of care, access to care, efficiency, and equity. 187 In 2000, the
World Health Organization's World Health Report ranked U.S. health
care thirty-seventh in the world.
188
Creating a universal health care scheme that provides coverage for
the uninsured may further distort the current scheme by reducing the
need for people to self insure or to provide insurance for their
employees. This would be another temporary fix to our health care
185. Id. at 435. Per capita health care spending in 1992 was between 69% and 174%
higher than that of other "developed" nations, when the United States ranked eighteenth for
life expectancy for females and twenty-third for males. Roche, supra note 2, at 1014. In
2000, the United States ranked twenty-fourth according to the World Health Organization.
Press Release, World Health Org., WHO Issues New Healthy Life Expectancy Rankings:
Japan Number One in New 'Healthy Life' System (June 4, 2000), available at
http://www.who.int/inf-pr-2000/en/pr2000-life.html.
186. The countries compared were Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom, countries that all have a form of universal health care coverage. KAREN
DAVIS ET AL., MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL: AN INTERNATIONAL UPDATE ON THE
COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE, 5 (2007) available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr--doc/1027-Davis-mirror-mirror-international-update
_final.pdf?section=4039.
187. Id.
188. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000-HEALTH
SYSTEMS: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE 155 (2000) available at
http://www.who.int/whr/2000/en/whr00_en.pdf. One author describes rationing as "an action
undertaken where there is: (a) a recognition that resources are limited, and (b) when faced
with scarcity, a method that must be devised to allocate fairly and reasonably those resources.
Rationing is the effort to distribute equitably scarce resources." Daniel Callahan, Symbols,
Rationality, and Justice: Rationing Health Care, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 3 (1992). This
definition certainly covers the efforts of managed care organizations to contain costs some
fifteen years after this article was written.
2007]
[Vol. 26:173
payment scheme, as the economics would shift with the unwillingness of
some people to pay for their own insurance. A more sensible approach
is the adoption of a single payer system.
Critics of single payer plans note that rationing of health care
occurs in countries using single payer systems, and that people in the
United States will not tolerate such a practice.189 Other critics observe
that, with the limited health care resources available, rationing in the
United States is already occurring based on one's ability to pay.' 90
Payment for health care in a single payer system is generally based on
cost effectiveness of the treatment. With about 95% of United States
citizens receiving health care as an employment benefit, Americans are
already experiencing medical care rationing.' 9' Managed care plans
routinely limit a patient's access to drugs, medical tests, medical
procedures, levels of mental health treatment, and other treatment based
on its cost, not on a particular patient's treatment choice.
B. Efforts to Address the Disparate Pricing Scheme in the Interim
Although emblematic of a deeper issue, some people have recently
begun to address the inequitable treatment of the uninsured through
litigation and legislation. Lawyers have challenged the practice of
billing the uninsured at inflated rates, states have passed laws to curtail
the practice, and some hospital chains have changed their pricing
structure in response to condemnation of the practice. Although
adoption of a single payer universal health care system would remedy
this issue, as well as the systematic problems, the efforts to remedy the
immediate issue also highlight the problems inherent in the system.
1. Lawsuits Challenging Uninsured Inequalities
Creative lawyers have directly challenged, with little success, the
practice of overcharging uninsured patients based upon a hospital's not-
for-profit status. Most of these claims in federal courts have been
dismissed. Most of this litigation has centered on the failure of not-for-
189. Kimberly A. Jones & Tricia M. Smith, Health Care Reform: An Analysis of
Potential Models, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 63, 68-69 (1993).
190. Posting of Jonathan Cohn to TPMCafe, http://www.tpmcafe.com/node/26805 (Feb.
27, 2006, 11:00 EST) ("Try getting a colonoscopy at County Hospital in Los Angeles if you
have no insurance.").
191. People who pay for care themselves, as well as those beneficiaries of government
health care plans, also are experiencing medical care rationing. Hermer, supra note 75, at 29.
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profit hospitals to provide adequate, or sometimes any, charitable care
for those in their community unable to pay for health care. 192 Not-for-
profit hospitals gain their tax-exempt status for serving a public interest
rather than a private interest. 193  Merely being not-for-profit is
insufficient to attain and maintain tax-exempt status, as "the status of
each nonprofit hospital is determined on a case-by-case basis by the
IRS."' 194 The lawsuits claim, in part, that the hospital has a duty to
perform work in the community interest, including treating uninsured
patients for reasonable fees. 
95
Since June of 2004, attorneys all over the country have initiated
lawsuits against not-for-profit hospitals, alleging that they have
overcharged uninsured patients, violating their tax-exempt status.
196
192. Leah Snyder Batchis, Comment, Can Lawsuits Help the Uninsured Access
Affordable Hospital Care? Potential Theories for Uninsured Patient Plaintiffs, 78 TEMP. L.
REV. 493, 505-06 (2005).
193. I.R.C. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(l)(ii) (2000); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 372 cmt. b
(1959).
194. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,29 (1976).
195. Batchis, supra note 192, at 523-24.
196. For cases dismissing federal claims, see Grant v. Trinity Health-Mich., 390 F. Supp.
2d 643, 658 (E.D. Mich. 2005); Hutt v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., No. 04-03440, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21548, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2005); Feliciano v. Thomas Jefferson Univ.
Hosp., No. 04-CV-04177, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21565, at *21 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2005);
McCoy v. E. Tex. Med. Ctr. Reg'l Healthcare Sys., No. 2:04-CV-223, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19416, at *29-30 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2005); Nash v. Lee Mem'l Health Sys., No.
204CV369FTM29DNF, 2005 WL 2043642, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2005); Kabeller v.
Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 6:04-cv-1 106-Orl-19DAB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20219, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2005); Cygan v. Resurrection Med. Ctr., No. 04C4168, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19867, at *5 (N.D. Il1. July 27, 2005); Gardner v. N. Miss. Health Servs.,
No. 1:04cv235, 2005 WL 1312753, at *5 (N.D. Miss. May 31, 2005); Amato v. UPMC, 371
F. Supp. 2d 752, 759 (W.D. Pa. 2005); Ellis v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., No. I:04-CV-
80(WLS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19935, at *15 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 8, 2005); Corely v. John D.
Archibold Mem'l Hosp., Inc., No. l:04-CV-1 10(WLS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8057, at *20
(M.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2005); Watts v. Advocate Health Care Network, No. 04C4062, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7418, at *14-15 (N.D. I11. Mar. 30, 2005); Valencia v. Miss. Baptist Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 867, 873-76 (S.D. Miss. 2005); Fields v. Banner Health, No. CIV-04-
1297-PHX-SRB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13481, at *22-23 (D. Ariz. Mar. 23, 2005); Jellison
v. Fla. Hosp. Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 6:04-cv-1021-Orl-28KRS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8036, at *26 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2005); Quinn v. BJC Health Sys., 364 F. Supp. 2d 1046,
1057 (E.D. Mo. 2005); Wright v. St. Dominic Health Servs., Inc., No. 3:04CV52ILN, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8086, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 1, 2005); Schmitt v. Protestant Mem'l Med.
Ctr., Inc., No. 04-CV-00577-DRH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7449, at *28 (S.D. I11. Feb. 23,
2005); Sabeta v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., No. 04-21437-C1V-JORDAN, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6132, at *59 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2005); Hagedom v. St. Thomas Hosp., Inc., No. 3:04-
0526, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7259, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 7, 2005); Peterson v. Fairview
Health Servs., Nos. 04-2973 ADMIAJB, 04-2974 ADM/AJB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1962, at
*10 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2005); Daly v. Baptist Health, No. 4:04CV789GH, 2005 U.S. Dist.
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These suits have been filed in twenty-six states in both federal and state
court. The cases allege that not-for-profit hospitals have failed in their
duty to provide a charitable service to the community, which is required
to maintain their favored tax status. The suits also claim, "non-profit,
tax-exempt hospitals are overcharging uninsured patients while
conspiring with the American Hospital Association (AHA) to profit and
hoard billions of dollars while suing the uninsureds to collect medical
charges." 197  Attorney Richard Scruggs, famous for his efforts in
litigating class action lawsuits against the tobacco and asbestos
industries, has spearheaded the suits against over three hundred not-for-
profit hospitals.1
98
Some lawsuits have even named the AHA as a defendant. The
AHA has responded, "the lawsuits we have seen to date are baseless and
don't begin to help solve the very real problem of the uninsured."' 99 The
president of the AHA has further stated, "[t]his assault on community
hospitals is misdirected-diverting focus away from the real issue of
how we as a nation are going to extend health care coverage to all
Americans. ' 2°
The AHA contemporaneously began efforts to ameliorate the
problem of billing of the uninsured by recommending to its members
that they alter their billing practices. One commentator suggested that
LEXIS 6270, at *14 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 31, 2005); Washington v. Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga., Inc.,
No. 5:04-cv-185(CAR), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2614, at *26 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2005);
Shriner v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., No. 3:04CV7435, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 894, at *2
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 21, 2005); Hudson v. Cent. Ga. Health Servs., No. 5:04CV301(DF), 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2613, at *28 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2005); Lorens v. Catholic Health Care
Partners, 356 F. Supp. 2d 827, 835 (N.D. Ohio 2005); Ferguson v. Centura Health Corp., 358
F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1021 (D. Colo. 2004); Burton v. William Beaumont Hosp., 347 F. Supp. 2d
486, 501 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (dismissing all federal claims except for those based on the
Emergency Medical Treatment Act and Active Labor Act); Kizzire v. Baptist Health Sys.,
Inc., 343 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1085 (N.D. Ala. 2004); Darr v. Sutter Health, No. C04-
02624WHA, 2004 WL 2873068, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2004); see also Burton v. William
Beaumont Hosp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 707, 713-24 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (dismissing federal claims
under the Emergency Medical Treatment Act and Active Labor Act and state law claims).
List compiled in Cohen, supra note 61, at 128 n.209.
197. Are Nonprofit Hospitals Preying on the Uninsured?, MEDICAL ETHICS ADVISOR,
Dec. 2004, (internal quotation marks omitted), available at
http://www.ahcpub.com/hot-topics/?htid=l&httid=1610 [hereinafter Preying on the
Uninsured].
198. Kaisernetwork.org, Charity Care: Philadelphia Inquirer Looks at Lawsuits Against
Hospitals (Aug. 9, 2004.),
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily-reports/rep-index.cfm?DRID=25172&hint=3.
199. Id.
200. Preying on the Uninsured, supra note 197.
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hospitals had "got[ten] caught with their hands in the cookie jar," and
once "they smelled litigation, they started changing their [billing and
collection] practices."' 0 ' Hospitals, however, have claimed that they
were unaware they could legally offer discounts to uninsured patients
who could not pay their hospital bills, as this practice might violate
federal anti-kickback laws. 20 2  "The Federal anti-kickback statute
prohibits a hospital from giving or receiving anything of value in
exchange for referrals of business payable by a federal health care
program, such as Medicare or Medicaid. 20 3 Although it seems absurd
that offering uninsureds a discount off the hospital's list price would
violate anti-kickback laws, surprising past applications of the statute
prompted the request for an opinion letter from the Office of the
Inspector General (OIG). 204 The opinion letter clarified the issue, stating
unequivocally that "no OIG authority prohibits or restricts hospitals
from offering discounts to uninsured patients who are unable to pay their
hospital bills.,
205
Specifically, the OIG has determined that section 1128 of the Social
Security Act permits the OIG "to exclude from participation in the
Federal health care programs any provider or supplier that submits bills
or requests for payment to Medicare or Medicaid for amounts that are
substantially more than the provider's or supplier's usual charges. 20 6
The OIG letter stated that it "has never excluded or attempted to exclude
any provider or supplier for offering discounts to uninsured or
underinsured patients. 20 7  Furthermore, the OIG stated that it fully
201. Id.
202. Social Security Act of 1935 § 1128(b)(6)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2000); see
also Kowalczyk, supra note 13.
203. Letter from the Office of Inspector General, Department of Health & Human
Services, Hospital Discounts Offered to Patients Who Cannot Afford to Pay Their Bills (Feb.
2, 2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2000)), available at
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/2004/FA021904hospitaldiscounts.pdf.
204. "Proposed regulations were issued in September, 2004 confirming the OIG's
position that providing discounts to the uninsured would not create liability exposure."
Medicare and Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of Terms and
Application of Program Exclusion Authority for Submitting Claims Containing Excessive
Charges, 68 Fed. Reg. 53939 (Sep. 15, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001), cited in
Robin Locke Nagele & Catherine Pajakinas, Charity Care Class Action Litigation is Denied
Federal Status, 17 HEALTH LAW. 1, 3 (March 2005).
205. Office of Inspector General, supra note 203, at 1.
206. Id. at 1-2.
207. id. at 2.
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supports the hospital industry's efforts to lower health care costs for
those unable to afford care.2°8
Other causes of action have been filed in attempts to redress the
problem of excessively high hospital rates for the uninsured. One
approach has been to claim unjust enrichment as a cause of action
against hospitals that bill uninsured patients at an exorbitant rate.209 One
case failed because the court found that the admission form was a legal
21contract. In another case, hospital officials defended the practice of
charging uninsured patients higher rates than any third party payer.
Sally Mason Boemer, Massachusetts General Hospital's vice president
of finance stated, "If I didn't have payers paying charges to make up for
Medicaid and free care, an institution this size would be in trouble.,
211
Breach of contract has been another cause of action against
hospitals that bill uninsured patients at exorbitant rates. "The lawsuits
claim that because no price is listed in the contract patients sign when
they are admitted, the hospitals should be required to charge a fair and
reasonable value for their services. 21 2 It is interesting to note that
unconscious patients brought to a hospital may actually be able to
challenge the list price under this claim, as they are held liable to the
reasonable value of services provided when emergency care is
rendered.213 When there is no express agreement to pay, the law implies
a promise to pay a reasonable fee for a health provider's services.
208. id. at 1.
209. See Pitts v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., No. 04CV1991-3, 2005 WL 5176797
(Ga. Super. Jun 23, 2005). In Pitts, the plaintiffs actually alleged numerous causes of action:
third party breach of contract, breach of contract, implied right of action, breach of duty of
good faith and fair dealing, violation of Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
unjust enrichment/constructive trust, fraud, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
breach of fiduciary duties, and negligence. The court defined unjust enrichment as a doctrine
which provides "that a benefited party should either return or compensate for benefits
conferred when there is no legal contract to pay." Id. at *3.
210. Id. See also Kowalczyk, supra note 13, at A l; Maze, supra note 105.
211. Kowalczyk, supra note 13.
212. See Maze, supra note 105.
213. Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 508
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) ("Thus, in a situation such as this [when an unconscious patient receives
medical treatment], the defendant should pay for what the services are ordinarily worth in the
community. Services are worth what people ordinarily pay for them. Whether the amount
charged is unconscionable and whether it shocks the conscience is irrelevant. While the
Hospital's published rates for services may be the same or less than rates at other Philadelphia
hospitals, the more important question is what health care providers actually receive for those
services." (internal citations omitted) (citing Eagle v. Snyder, 604 A.2d 253 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992))). For a thorough discussion on the unconscionability of billing of the uninsured, see
Nation III, supra note 61.
QLR
OVERCHARGING ThE UNINSURED
2. Legislative Response to Disparate Pricing for the Uninsured
Several states and Congress have attempted to correct the inequities
of hospital billing practices. The "Hospital Billing Fairness Act" was
introduced during the 108th Congress.1 4 This act attempted to require
hospitals to certify that the hospital would not bill or collect from an
uninsured patient an amount that exceeds 125% of the full payment
amount permitted under title XVIII of the Social Security Act.21 5  A
hospital found to be in violation of this act would be subject to a civil
216penalty of up to three times the amount charged in excess. Two states
have passed laws that forbid excessive charging of the uninsured: New
York and California. In New York, hospitals cannot charge patients
more for medical care than the hospital would charge their highest
volume payer, Medicare, or Medicaid. The same law also provides
protection from harsh collection practices for unpaid hospital bills, such
as foreclosing on one's home.21 7
In California, Governor Schwarzenegger signed a bill into law that
made it the second state to protect uninsured and low-income patients
from overcharging by hospitals. 218  His approval of the law was
somewhat of a surprise, as a few years earlier he had vetoed legislation
requiring screening of self-pay patients to determine their eligibility for
public health insurance programs or hospital charity care. 219  The
previous bill would also have required the self-pay patients to receive
214. Hospital Billing Fairness Act of 2004, H.R. 4092, 108th Cong. (2004). The Act
never became law.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-k (McKinney 2007).
218. Laura B. Benko, California Governor Signs Pricing Bill: Law Aims to Protect
Patients From Aggressive Billing, MODERN HEALTHCARE, October 9, 2006, at 10. This
occurred one week after the governor vetoed a bill that would have created a single payer
health insurance system in California. Id. See also Press Release, Health Access California,
Uninsured and Overcharged: New Consumer Protections for Hospital Patients (Oct. 2006),
available at http://www.health-access.org/providing/ab774.htm ("AB 774 (Chapter 775,
Statutes of 2006), by Assemblywoman Wilma Chan and sponsored by Health Access
California, would prevent hospitals from overcharging and [engaging in] other unfair billing
practices. This new law, which takes effect January 2007, will curb the common practice of
hospitals overcharging the uninsured and underinsured, in many cases charging three to ten
times what insurance companies and government programs would pay for exactly the same
service.").
219. 2004 Immigrant Rights Legislation: The Final Picture, CALIFORNIA UPDATE (Cal.
Immigrant Welfare Collaborative), Nov. 8, 2004, at 2, available at
http://www.nilc.org/ciwc/nwsltr/caupd6-04.pdf [hereinafter 2004 hnmigrant Rights
Legislation]. See also Benko, supra note 218, at 10.
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notice about their rights and financial options at the hospital, and would
have protected patients from having their bills sent to collections
prematurely.22°
Other states have sought to ameliorate the disparate pricing
scheme's effect by enacting laws to make hospital pricing more
transparent. In Maine, hospitals and physicians were originally required
to make available to patients a list of their prices for the fifteen most
common in-patient and the twenty most common outpatient
procedures. 221  Maine also required posting of the state's average
charges for the in-patient procedures.222
3. Revising the Tax Code
In the short term, to curtail the practice of subsidizing health care
by permitting the write-off of unpaid, inflated hospital bills to the
uninsured, there could be immediate revision of the federal tax code.
Although the tax code permits the write-off of bad debts,223 two criteria
must be met.224 First, there must be a valid and enforceable obligation to
pay a fixed or determinable sum of money.225 Admission forms have
been found to be valid contracts, and challenges to the validity of these
contracts have not fared well in the courts.226 Next, there must be a
227reasonable expectation of repayment. Although much of the care
provided for the uninsured ends up being uncollected, some of the
uninsured, like Mr. Hernon,228 actually do pay the list price. It is
arguable that the tax code already prohibits deducting these inflated
accounts, as they would be unlikely to pass the "economic reality
test., 229 The economic reality test considers whether an objective,
220. 2004 Immigrant Rights Legislation, supra note 219, at 2.
221. Kenneth T. Bowden II, Determining a Reasonable Price for Health Care in the
United States: Is this Possible?, 34 BRIEF 26 (2005) (citing An Act to Provide Affordable
Health Insurance to Small Businesses and Individuals and to Control Health Care Costs, 2003
Me. Pub. L. No. 469).
222. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1718 (2005).
223. 26 U.S.C.§ 166(2000).
224. Davis v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 122, 142-43 (1987).
225. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-1(c) (1998).
226. See, e.g., Pitts v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., No. 04CV1991-3, 2005 WL
5176797 (Ga. Super. Jun 23, 2005).
227. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-1(c) (1998).
228. See supra Part I.
229. See Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 697 (3d Cir. 1968).
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"outside" party would advance the funds.230 This test would be difficult
to apply for the provision of medical services. A new provision in the
tax code, however, could deem any overcharging of patients, at a rate
higher than 110% of a provider's reimbursement from their most used
third party payers, to be prima facie evidence of fraud if that provider
attempts to claim a tax write-off.
4. Other Approaches
Other approaches for health care reform include extending
government reinsurance programs to make private health care available
universally. 231  These programs have the effect of underwriting
individuals and small groups of people by placing them into a larger
pool, realizing the lower cost of the larger population. The Federal
Trade Commission issued a report in 2004 which predicted that more
economic competition should be part of the cure for our country's health
care problems.232  Other patches to the health care system include
reducing direct care funding for some low-income populations, and
instead offering a refundable tax credit, or some fixed amount of money,
to assist low and middle income people to pay for private health
insurance.233 The New America Foundation's plan would guarantee
access to insurance for everyone; in return, each citizen would be
230. Charles Herbst & Giles B. Sutton, When Debts Turn Sour: Clarifying the Process of
Claiming a Bad-Debt Deduction, 42-Mar RES GESTAE 8, 9 (1999).
231. Through reinsurance programs, many state programs already attempt to make
private health care insurance more affordable to individuals and small groups who may
otherwise be unable to secure coverage. Jacobi, supra note 4, at 538.
232. See FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A
DOSE OF COMPETITION 4 (2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/health-care/204694.pdf. Professor Jost compares the role of
competition in the FTC approach, with that of the provision of health care in European
universal health care systems. Instead of relying on the invisible hand to straighten out issues
of access, price and quality, the European approach is one based upon the principle of health
care as a right, that "all members of society must have access to health care regardless of their
ability to pay." Timothy S. Jost, Diane Dawson & Andrd den Exter, The Role of Competition
in Health Care: A Western European Perspective, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 687, 688
(2006). Note also that critics of the failed 1993 Clinton plan to reform the United States
health care system predicted that the system would reform itself through free-market
competition. Rory Weiner, Universal Health Insurance Under State Equal Protection Law, 23
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 327, 327 (2002). Actually since that time, the number of uninsured has
continued to increase, prices have risen dramatically, and quality of care has worsened. Id. at
327-28.
233. Hermer, supra note 75, at 4.
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responsible for acquiring and maintaining a health care policy with
assistance of his or her employer and the federal government.234
Because of powerful insurance lobbying and other economic
concerns, some commentators are less than optimistic about any
approach to overhauling our current health care payment system. In his
recent analysis of our system, Dr. William P. Gunnar flatly concluded,
"[u]niversal health care cannot be achieved in the United States due to
the strength and complexity of the current health care system.
' 235
Radical changes to our health care payment systems may seem
impossible. Even if they are possible, some believe changes of such
magnitude can only evolve over time. In the past century, however,
many of the European nations adopting a single payer system made
abrupt changes to a system of government-centered universal care.236
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maine, and California have also enacted
237legislation in efforts to provide universal health care for their citizens.
CONCLUSION
A hospital payment system that charges uninsured patients a rate
easily characterized as over-inflated is one small but indefensible
anomaly in the management of health care costs in the United States.
Overcharging uninsured patients, who will then likely default on their
payment obligations, serves to inflate the value of services for which the
hospital has not received payment. This in turn inflates the amount that
a hospital can write off, or the amount of charity care provided by a
hospital seeking to maintain its not-for-profit status.
In some instances, hospitals admittedly take advantage of high
profit margin payers to help subsidize their indigent patients and
otherwise assist the hospital to operate in the black.238 Although the
practice of overcharging the uninsured could be curtailed considerably
234. Jonathan Barry Forman, Making Universal Health Care Work, 19 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 137, 145 (2006). Professor Forman also suggests a taxing and funding scheme to
transition the United States to a country with universal health care access.
235. His article is a review of legal issues of access to health care in the United States
from a physician's point of view. Gunnar, supra note 2, at 179.
236. Robert G. Evans, Fellow Travelers on a Contested Path: Power, Purpose, and the
Evolution of European Health Care Systems, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 277, 281-82
(2005). The author notes that many people believe that Europeans have always had universal
health care, but points out that many changed their systems quickly in response to economic,
social, and political pressures.
237. Forman, supra note 234, at 146.
238. Kowalczyk, supra note 13.
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by revising the tax code, it is becoming more evident that larger scale
reform is in order. Legislative approaches to regulating hospital list
prices may be an effective way to fix the immediate problem for
uninsured patients, but this is only treating the symptoms of a systemic
failure.
This system that, to some degree, has relied upon overcharging
uninsured patients has been effectively shifting the additional cost of
providing health care onto the federal government. Medicare
reimbursements under Medicare and Medicaid are, by law, close to the
break-even point; but, if the system is only profitable by writing off
over-inflated hospital bills, perhaps even the discount rate for third party
payers is artificially low and subsidized to some degree by the taxpayer.
The hospital list rates are arbitrarily established and should either be
abandoned or discounted in a more fair and equitable way that does not
penalize the uninsured and, by default, the federal government. The
problem of the entire structure of this nation's health care system being
based upon imaginary costs and outdated modes of payment should
really be addressed in a comprehensive manner, whether through
implementation of universal health care or by an innovative and
complete restructuring of our health care payment system.
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